UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/990
29 November 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 1063 (1996) which established the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH),

1. Decides to extend UNSMIH's mandate for an additional period terminating on 5 December 1996;

2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

96-34351 (E) 291196

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/51/699
S/1996/991
29 November 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda items 33 and 35
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
QUESTION OF PALESTINE

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 27 November 1996 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement issued by the League of Arab States denouncing the measures taken by Israel to expand the settlements in the occupied Arab territories. Kindly inform the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council of this statement and also arrange for it to be distributed as a document of the Security Council and of the General Assembly under agenda items 33 and 35.

(Signed) Mahmoud ABOUL-NASR
Ambassador
Head of Mission
New York

ANNEX

Statement issued on 24 November 1996 by the Secretariat of the League of Arab States denouncing the measures taken by Israel to expand the settlements in the occupied Arab territories

The Secretariat of the League of Arab States is following with grave concern the decision of the Israeli Government to expand the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, occupied Arab Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights. It reaffirms that the measures taken by the Israeli Government to that end contribute to the tension in the region and generate an increase in acts of violence, in addition to the fact that those practices are causing a loss of confidence in the sincerity of the Israeli Government in moving forward in the peace process, and threaten to undermine that process.

The Secretariat of the League of Arab States, in denouncing those measures, holds the Israeli Government fully responsible for the outcome of its practices, which are incompatible with the rules and principles of international law, the decisions of international legitimacy and the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. It reaffirms that the continuation by the Israeli Government of those practices, and the acts of repression, terrorism and torture committed by it against citizens in the occupied Arab territories, will merely result in the creation of a thick wall of mistrust, compounded by the Israeli court's latest decision that Israeli interrogators are permitted to continue their bodily torture of Palestinian detainees. The Secretariat considers this decision to be a flagrant violation of the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the spirit of the current peace process in the region.

The Secretariat of the League of Arab States calls upon the States involved in the peace process in the Middle East, and in particular the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the States members of the European Union, to move speedily and effectively to maintain the momentum achieved in the peace process and to compel Israel to abide by the provisions of international law and the decisions of international legitimacy, especially Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 252 (1968), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978), and the principle of land for peace, with a view to transforming the Middle East into a region of peace, security and stability.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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29 November 1996
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LETTER DATED 28 NOVEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of an incident that took place on 23 November 1996. At 0530 hours the Iraqi fishing vessel Shatt al-Arab was fishing five nautical miles south of Mina' al-Bakr when the United States frigate bearing hull number 33 demanded that the master should allow his vessel to be searched. At 0730 hours a number of men from the frigate boarded the Iraqi vessel, and they left at 0850 hours after completing their search.

I request your intervention with the United States of America with a view to halting and preventing any repetition of acts of aggression and provocation by United States warships against Iraqi civilian vessels, given that such acts are in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of public international law.

I also affirm the legally established right of the Republic of Iraq to seek compensation for the damage caused to its property by this act of aggression, in accordance with the principle of international responsibility.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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29 November 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 1078 (1996)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution 1078 (1996) of 9 November 1996, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with his Special Envoy, the Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Special Envoy of the European Union (EU) and the States concerned, to draw up a concept of operations and framework for a humanitarian task force.

2. During the past few weeks, and in particular since 15 November, the situation in eastern Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi has changed rapidly and dramatically. In view of this sudden transformation, it may be useful for the Council to receive a detailed account of recent events there, in which political, military and humanitarian aspects are closely interlinked. For the same reason, it is difficult at the present stage to provide the Council with a comprehensive concept of operations for a humanitarian task force. Indeed, it is still unclear what the scope of such a force's tasks would be, especially when the nature, strength and modus operandi of the multinational force to be established under resolution 1080 (1996) of 15 November 1996 have yet to be finalized.

3. The present report is based on information available to the Secretariat up to 26 November 1996.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The situation in Zaire

4. Since September 1996, the situation in eastern Zaire has undergone a sharp transformation. Fighting between the Zairian Army and the rebels intensified and resulted in the rebels' takeover, by 4 November 1996, of the towns of Uvira, Bukavu and Goma. The fighting caused a massive movement of over a million Rwandan and Burundian refugees who needed urgent humanitarian relief. Greatly concerned by these developments, the Secretary-General wrote to the President of

the Security Council on 14 and 24 October (S/1996/875 and S/1996/878) and personally briefed the Council on 25 October and 8 November. He has also been in constant touch with the Heads of State of the countries of the region and with the current Chairman, President Paul Biya of the Republic of Cameroon, and the Secretary-General of OAU.

5. On 4 November 1996, the leader of the rebel group that calls itself the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), Mr. Laurent-Désiré Kabila, announced a unilateral ceasefire. On 10 November, he promised to open a humanitarian corridor for refugees and relief organizations. However, he warned that any humanitarian organizations wishing to operate in what he called "liberated zones" had to deal with the ADFL. He added that, if an international force did not intervene quickly, his forces would attack Mugunga refugee camp, from which, he claimed, Goma had been shelled on 9 and 10 November.

6. Reacting to that statement, on 10 November the Zairian Minister of Information warned international organizations not to deal with or support the rebels, otherwise the Government could withdraw their right to work inside Zaire. The divergent positions of the rebels and of the Government of Zaire on this issue have made negotiations regarding humanitarian corridors and the return of aid agencies, whose relocation the Secretary-General had reluctantly authorized earlier, to eastern Zaire extremely difficult.

United Nations Special Envoys

7. During the early stages of the conflict between the rebels and the Zairian Army in South Kivu, the Secretary-General twice sent a Special Envoy, Mr. Ibrahima Fall, to the region for fact-finding purposes. His first mission took place on 22 and 23 September 1996 after the Zairian authorities had accused the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and several non-governmental organizations of providing assistance to the Banyamulenge. The Special Envoy was able to establish that these accusations were unfounded and his visit helped to reduce the tension between the Zairian authorities and UNHCR. The purpose of his second mission, from 18 to 24 October, was, if possible, to identify courses of action that could help control or resolve the conflict. On 30 October, Mr. Fall gave the members of the Security Council an oral briefing on the situation in the Great Lakes region. Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, also briefed the Council on 25 October.

8. On 29 October, the Secretary-General again wrote to the President of the Council (S/1996/888), informing him that he had decided to appoint Mr. Raymond Chrétien (Canada) as his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region. The Special Envoy's tasks would be threefold: to consult with all concerned in order to establish the facts relating to the present conflicts and to develop plans for defusing the tension and establishing a ceasefire and a process of negotiations; to explore the possibilities for the early convening of a regional conference; and to present the Secretary-General with advice on the mandate to be given to a special representative whom he might appoint for the region and on the size and structure of the United Nations political presence that, in

consultation with the Governments concerned, would be established in the Great Lakes region.

9. On 30 October 1996, a technical mission of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, led by Assistant Secretary-General Behrooz Sadry, arrived in Kinshasa to discuss with the Government of Zaire the possible deployment of United Nations observers, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1053 (1996). Given the deterioration of the situation in eastern Zaire and the fact that it was physically impossible for the technical mission to proceed to eastern Zaire at that time, the Secretary-General instructed Mr. Sadry to prepare the way for the Chrétien mission. Accordingly, Mr. Sadry met with the Prime Minister and other government Ministers for this purpose, as well as with members of the Kinshasa diplomatic corps and the Special Envoy of EU.

10. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General arrived in Kinshasa on 8 November 1996, having first called on President Mobutu Sese Seko of the Republic of Zaire in the south of France. Since then he has been shuttling between the capitals of the subregion in a continuous effort to obtain the various parties' agreement to a number of measures that need to be taken if this complex crisis is to be controlled and resolved. These measures include an end to the fighting, an easing of tension between the States of the subregion, the voluntary and orderly return of refugees to Rwanda and Burundi and the initiation of a negotiating process that could lead to the convening of a regional or international conference. At the same time the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, in close collaboration with the Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region, has worked intensively to help create conditions for the speedy delivery of humanitarian relief to refugees and displaced persons. His interlocutors have also raised with him issues related to the deployment of an international force in eastern Zaire, especially since the adoption of resolutions 1078 (1996) and 1080 (1996) on 9 and 15 November, respectively.

11. At the time of writing, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General has paid one or more visits to the capitals of Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire and has had extensive conversations on all aspects of his mandate with the leaders of those countries, with Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, with the Secretary-General of OAU and with a number of other international personalities who have been contributing to the international search for ways to restore peace and security and to address the enormous humanitarian problems in the subregion. The Special Envoy will complete his mission about 10 December and will then return to New York to brief the Secretary-General and the Security Council on his findings.

12. The Special Envoy's first consultations with Rwandan and Zairian leaders confirmed the differences in their view of the situation. The Rwandan leaders stated that their country was not in a state of war with Zaire and that Rwandan forces were not involved in the hostilities in eastern Zaire. They were willing to meet with the Zairian authorities, provided the time and the place of the meeting were acceptable to both sides. They reaffirmed that Rwanda was willing to facilitate the voluntary return of refugees. They also stated that a multinational force should have a strictly humanitarian mandate. On 11 November, during their talks with a delegation of EU, they agreed to open the country's borders with Zaire for humanitarian aid.

13. On the other hand, the Zairian leaders considered Zaire to be at war with Rwanda, conveying to the Special Envoy their demands for an official ceasefire and the withdrawal of the Rwandan forces, which, they alleged, were occupying Zairian territory. They also suggested a high-level meeting between the leaderships of the two countries.

Deployment of an international force in eastern Zaire

14. On 5 November, at the invitation of President Daniel T. Arap Moi of the Republic of Kenya, the Presidents of Eritrea, Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, together with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, the Foreign Minister of Cameroon (representing the current Chairman of OAU), the Secretary-General of OAU and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere met in Nairobi to deliberate on the conflict in eastern Zaire. The Government of Zaire was invited but did not attend. In a statement issued at the end of the meeting, the summit agreed that an immediate ceasefire should be strictly observed; reaffirmed its commitment to the territorial integrity of Zaire; called for non-intervention and an end to cross-border incursions; reaffirmed the inalienable rights of all people as stipulated in international conventions relevant to the right of citizenship and nationality; called for the immediate setting up of safe corridors and temporary sanctuaries inside Zaire to facilitate humanitarian assistance and the repatriation of refugees; called for the implementation of the long-standing decision to separate the intimidators (i.e. the ex-Rwandese Armed Forces personnel and the extremist Hutu militias) and bona fide refugees; requested the Security Council to deploy a neutral force; and reaffirmed the readiness of the subregion to make its own contribution to this effort.

15. On 7 November, the Secretary-General wrote again to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/916). In both that letter and his briefing on 8 November, the Secretary-General suggested that the best response to the humanitarian crisis in eastern Zaire would be for those Member States which possessed the necessary capacity to take the lead in putting together a multinational force and to seek the Security Council's authorization for its deployment. The mandate of such a force would be to ensure the minimum security necessary to permit stabilization of the situation and enable civilian agencies to bring relief to the refugees and start preparing for their repatriation.

16. On 11 November, the 17-member Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflict met in Addis Ababa to discuss the crisis. A statement issued after the meeting called on the Security Council to authorize immediately the rapid deployment of a neutral force to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees, as well as to ensure their return to Rwanda, and stressed that African participation in such a force was pivotal. The statement also asked the Security Council and the international community to take measures to ensure that the necessary financial, logistical and material resources to support the participation of African countries were provided on a reliable and lasting basis.

17. On 12 November, President Mobutu met in southern France with South African Vice-President Thabo Mbeki and, on 14 November, with the Foreign Ministers of the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya and Ethiopia. President Mobutu reportedly urged the establishment of secure corridors for the supply of

humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General had received a similar request from Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo in Kinshasa.

18. The Security Council kept under continuing consideration the deteriorating situation in eastern Zaire and adopted resolutions 1078 (1996) and 1080 (1996).

III. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

19. The situation in eastern Zaire remains extremely volatile. The large-scale movement of refugees across the Rwandan border that began on 15 November has significantly changed the humanitarian landscape, but population movements in the Great Lakes region are far from over. At the time of finalizing the present report, it was extremely difficult to estimate with any degree of precision the magnitude and implications of the continuing population flows into Rwanda and within eastern Zaire.

Overview of recent developments

20. There were 1.24 million refugees in eastern Zaire before the recent conflict, 1.1 million of whom were Rwandan and the others Burundian. These figures are based on past verifications and on the UNHCR/World Food Programme (WFP) food assessment mission undertaken last October in North Kivu, in which EU and the United States Government participated as observers. While the situation keeps fluctuating, it was roughly as follows on 25 November 1996:

(a) An estimated 500,000 Rwandan refugees have returned to their country since 15 November;

(b) According to earlier estimates of UNHCR, over 700,000 refugees remained in Zaire. More recent estimates put the number between 300,000 and 700,000. Reports indicate groups of people in several large new concentrations, including at locations south of Uvira, south-west of Bukavu, north-west of Bukavu, between Bukavu and Goma and north-west of Goma. It is assumed that the majority of these persons are from the refugee camps, but there are likely to be displaced Zairians among them and significant numbers of displaced Zairians elsewhere;

(c) So far 36,000 Burundian refugees have returned to their country from the Uvira region of Zaire;

(d) There have been considerable new influxes from eastern Zaire into Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. They involve mostly Zairian nationals, but also include Rwandan and Burundian refugees;

(e) The United Republic of Tanzania continues to host 535,000 Rwandan refugees and has faced an additional influx of 49,000 refugees from Burundi since 1 November.

Rwanda

21. In Rwanda, the sudden mass return of refugees from Zaire was a welcome, if unexpected, development, which broke the deadlock that had prevailed since mid-1994 and eased the humanitarian crisis caused by recent fighting in North and South Kivu. In a matter of hours, an unabated stream of refugees poured into Rwanda through the Goma-Gisenyi border crossing, stretching to their limits the reception, transit relief and transportation capacity of the Government of Rwanda and international organizations. The Government of Rwanda has cooperated in facilitating the processing and onward movement of some 500,000 returnees so far. The Secretary-General commends international organizations for their coordinated effort at meeting this major humanitarian challenge. This sudden and massive repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Zaire has generated a momentum the Government of Rwanda can use to promote national reconciliation and the easing of tension and insecurity in eastern Zaire. Rwanda will need assistance from the international community. In accordance with a request by the Government, returnees will be provided not only with transportation and standardized return packages but also with food security for a period of six months from WFP and with a variety of other types of assistance by UNHCR aimed at promoting their reintegration, ranging from shelter projects to activities in support of vulnerable groups, women in particular.

22. As part of an overall effort planned and coordinated by the Government of Rwanda and under the lead of the United Nations Resident Coordinator, inter-agency plans involving the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), WFP, UNHCR, other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations are being developed in order to ensure that a long-term community-based rehabilitation and development strategy is devised and implemented from the early stages of the repatriation movement. It is crucial that a simultaneous, rather than a sequential, approach be followed towards short-term reintegration assistance and long-term rehabilitation and developmental aid. In this regard, the informal donor meeting of refugee reintegration in the Great Lakes region of Africa held on 23 November 1996 at Geneva at the initiative of the Government of Canada was extremely important.

23. Healing the traumas of war, genocide and suffering in exile will be an enormous challenge. If reconciliation is to have a chance, the people of Rwanda must reach agreement on building an inclusive society and for the wounds of genocide to heal there must be justice. In coping with local tensions that may emerge as a result of this sudden influx of returnees, the Government of Rwanda will also require international support in strengthening its system of justice, especially at the commune level. In particular, the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda deployed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights will require secured funding in order to increase the number of its monitors in Rwanda. Other agencies will also continue to assist the Rwandan judiciary through institution-rebuilding projects intended, in particular, to facilitate the early implementation of the recently adopted Genocide Law, which, in turn, should help reduce the number of detainees awaiting trial, who are currently estimated at some 85,000.

Burundi

24. In Burundi, some 36,000 refugees repatriated from Zaire, mainly from the Uvira region. In fact, the insurgents in South Kivu are said to have organized their return to Burundi and to have brutalized, and allegedly even killed, a number of male refugees, mostly before they crossed the border.

25. On the Burundian side, the main concern of the Secretary-General is the safety of people returning to troubled areas, especially Cibitoke province, where according to recently confirmed reports 300 returnees were massacred in a church on 27 October. After a number of démarches, UNHCR gained access to the border areas for assistance and protection purposes. Following intensive discussions between the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator, the UNHCR Special Envoy and the Government of Burundi, the authorities promised every possible effort to ensure the security of returnees. This may include the temporary regrouping of returnees in some areas, if possible close to their own villages. This solution may still be better than facing the dangers of conflict and hunger in eastern Zaire. However, as a matter of priority it must be combined with assured safe access for humanitarian staff and human rights observers. The international presence in Burundi must therefore be enhanced. At present, there are only five human rights monitors stationed in the entire country. The Government of Burundi has welcomed the plan of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to increase their number to 35 as soon as the necessary resources are made available to him.

26. The problem of returnees in Burundi is further compounded by the large number of internally displaced persons, said to number some half a million, to whom only a modest level of assistance is being provided.

Zaire

27. As for Zaire, the return of a significant number of Rwandan and Burundian refugees to their countries is undoubtedly a positive development. The policy of the Government of Zaire has been that refugees must repatriate and international assistance should no longer be made available in Zaire but in their countries of origin. The presence of refugees in North and South Kivu was considered a threat both to internal stability and to security along Zaire's borders with Burundi and Rwanda. In this connection, the Secretary-General wishes to pay tribute to the Government of Zaire, which over the past two and a half years has carried the major burden in hosting the largest number of refugees in the subregion.

28. However, as at 25 November, up to 700,000 Rwandan and Burundian refugees and displaced Zairians are believed to remain in eastern Zaire. Despite improved access to areas close to Goma and Bukavu and missions to Kisangani and Walakali, United Nations agencies have so far been unable to re-establish contact with these populations, assess their numbers and their conditions accurately or provide them with life-sustaining assistance. Access to and protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and local affected populations in eastern Zaire thus remain cause for very grave concern.

29. Reference has already been made to the elements of the former Rwandese Armed Forces and extremist militias who are still believed to be at large in Zaire. Measures will have to be agreed upon to determine how many will continue to qualify for refugee status and what solution can be found for them, pending their repatriation. International protection and assistance will no longer be available for those who do not qualify for refugee status or who, for other reasons, may be excluded from the statute of UNHCR or from the protection of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and/or of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Among these people there may be persons who fall within the competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and who will have to be dealt with accordingly.

30. A large and as yet undetermined number of Zairian nationals have been displaced as a result of recent fighting. In its resolutions 1078 (1996) and 1080 (1996), the Security Council recognized the plight of this category of victims of the conflict. International organizations will, in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), cooperate with the Government of Zaire in extending to them material assistance and the necessary protection, in returning them to their homes, security conditions permitting, and in rehabilitating them.

31. It is also extremely important that international assistance should be resumed for the rehabilitation of the infrastructure and the environment in areas of North and South Kivu affected by the previous presence of refugee populations.

United Republic of Tanzania

32. As at 27 November 1996, the United Republic of Tanzania hosted a total of 756,000 refugees, including 535,000 Rwandans, 189,000 Burundians and 30,700 Zairians. UNHCR has been assisting the Government in the formulation of a plan to facilitate their voluntary return. It is hoped that recent large-scale returns from Zaire will encourage the refugee population in the United Republic of Tanzania to do so as well and that their repatriation will be carried out in an organized and phased manner, so as not to overstretch the absorption capacity of the Government of Rwanda. Meanwhile, UNHCR, UNDP and other agencies are reinforcing their infrastructure repair and environmental rehabilitation activities in the Ngara and Kagera provinces.

33. As regards the Burundian refugee population, direct arrivals from Burundi had been increasing since early 1996, but the number of arrivals since 1 November 1996 has reached 49,000. As a result of the recent hostilities in South Kivu, some Burundian refugees are believed to have crossed Lake Tanganyika from the Zairian shore and to have sought asylum in the United Republic of Tanzania. In the prevailing circumstances in Burundi, only volunteers should be repatriated to Burundi. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Secretary-General appeal to the United Republic of Tanzania and to Zaire to continue to extend asylum to this category of persons in keeping with their countries' long-standing tradition of hospitality to persons in need of international protection. The Secretary-General pays tribute to both these

Governments for what they have already done so generously in response to this appeal.

34. The Secretary-General also wishes to express his gratitude to the Governments of Kenya and Uganda for the logistical facilities that they have continued to extend to humanitarian agencies since the beginning of the current crisis in eastern Zaire.

Humanitarian response to the current situation

35. Prior to the current crisis, individual United Nations agencies, in particular, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), had undertaken extensive emergency preparedness measures and stockpiled food and other relief commodities in the region. At the same time, United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and donor Governments agreed to the need for an improved overall policy, programme cohesion and a coordination mechanism. On 6 November, after consulting with concerned agencies, the Secretary-General decided to appoint Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, as Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region and Mr. Martin Griffiths, Director, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva, as the Deputy Regional Humanitarian Coordinator, pending the receipt of his Special Envoy's recommendations on longer-term arrangements for the coordination of United Nations efforts in the area.

36. To carry out his responsibilities, the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator has been working closely with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, as well as remaining in regular contact with government representatives and concerned authorities and maintaining close contact with the Special Envoys of the United States, EU and other actors in the region. He will also establish an appropriate mechanism for liaison with the multinational force as and when it is set up, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolutions 1078 (1996) and 1080 (1996). The Regional Coordinator will act as an advocate and facilitator to ensure the coherence of the overall humanitarian effort in the Great Lakes region. At present, however, the immediate needs are to secure access to those affected by the current conflict, to stabilize their condition and to ensure that relief agencies can provide emergency assistance and support repatriation programmes in a well-coordinated manner. Non-governmental organizations and other operational humanitarian organizations will be strongly encouraged to participate in the coordination mechanism of the United Nations system, regardless of their funding sources.

37. Humanitarian agencies are currently permitted only very limited access to the areas of displacement in eastern Zaire. This denies them a basis for detailed programming. Nor, given the security situation in the area, can any detailed assessments be undertaken at this time. At the same time, the plight of the affected population does not permit further delay in the mobilization of funds and the deployment of assistance. This must be provided through the most suitable and expeditious routes of access. The great majority of the humanitarian agencies believe that these conditions can be fulfilled only if the multinational force is deployed in a way that will ensure them the access they need and provide the necessary security for the transportation and distribution

of relief supplies. They are concerned at the delays that have taken place and at indications that the mandate of the force may fall short of what was originally envisaged when resolutions 1078 (1996) and 1080 (1996) were adopted.

38. Meanwhile, the complexity of the situation and the continuing uncertainties in the region oblige the humanitarian organizations to adopt a high degree of flexibility in programming and in such implementation as is currently possible. They are, however, proceeding on the assumption that:

(a) Emergency relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts will shift to areas inside Rwanda to a much greater extent than hitherto anticipated;

(b) The geographical area in which humanitarian assistance needs will have to be addressed is likely to be much wider than hitherto anticipated, extending westward into the interior of Zaire.

39. On 18 November, the Secretary-General launched a flash appeal requesting the international community to contribute $259.4 million to address the most immediate requirements in food, health, nutrition, water and sanitation, agriculture, coordination, logistics and communications in eastern Zaire and Rwanda. The appeal is for a three-month period and will be followed by a one-year inter-agency consolidated appeal to be launched in late January 1997. The flash appeal takes into account the 1996 inter-agency consolidated resource mobilization document, for which 80.6 per cent of funds had been received as at 4 November and from which initial stocks of supplies, material and equipment were purchased and the hiring of a number of staff was made possible to address the immediate situation. The Secretary-General is encouraged that nearly 30 per cent of this amount has been pledged so far.

40. The sudden and unexpected return puts a strain on two other aspects of assistance. The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda has a current strength of 107 human rights observers. It is of great importance that this should be quickly raised to the planned strength of 200 observers in order to cover larger areas of the country to which refugees are currently returning. It is estimated that by January 1997 an additional 100 human rights observers will also be required. The second issue concerns the transport of returnees from the border to their places of origin. Funds for this purpose will be required faster than initially anticipated. United Nations agencies are likely to need to call upon additional staff to assist with their respective programmes. One possible source will be the United Nations Volunteers programme, which has already provided valuable assistance in the Great Lakes region.

IV. PREPARATION OF A HUMANITARIAN TASK FORCE

41. As of the date of the present report, the nature, strength, composition, mandate and modus operandi of the multinational force envisaged under resolutions 1078 (1996) and 1080 (1996) are still under consideration by the Member States concerned. As long as the Member States involved in the discussions have not taken a final decision on all these matters, it would not be possible for the Secretary-General to present to the Council a detailed

concept of operations for the proposed follow-on humanitarian task force. The situation since the adoption of the relevant resolutions by the Council has changed substantially and is still evolving rapidly. The mandate, structure and composition of the proposed humanitarian task force will depend, inter alia, on the tasks that the multinational force, if and when deployed, will have accomplished at the time of transition, the tasks that will remain to be carried out, the logistic support that the Member States participating in the multinational force will be prepared to transfer to the successor mission and the number of Member States that, having contributed contingents to the multinational force, will choose to continue to contribute to the humanitarian task force.

V. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

42. Seldom have humanitarian problems been so closely intertwined with historical, political, sociological and legal considerations as in the Great Lakes region. As a result of the recent outbreak of military activity in North and South Kivu, the humanitarian situation is undergoing dramatic changes and is likely to continue to evolve rapidly in the coming weeks.

43. On the basis of the experience of the past two years, the international community has come to recognize that the presence of more than one million refugees on the borders of their country of origin constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the entire region. The present situation in eastern Zaire, in all its complexity, may offer the international community a unique opportunity to address the roots of the problem that led to the establishment and perpetuation of the refugee camps there. This opportunity must not be missed, nor must the immediate humanitarian emergency be neglected. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have already returned to Rwanda and that is a most welcome development. However, hundreds of thousands more, in addition to large numbers of internally displaced Zairians, are still scattered in eastern Zaire without access to help from the international community. That must be our first priority. There must be no return to the status quo ante and above all no re-creation of the refugee camps in eastern Zaire. But we must at the same time work both on the smooth reintegration of returnees into their home communities and on a longer-term solution to the deep-rooted problems that turned them into refugees in the first place.

44. Advantage must therefore be taken of the recent events to encourage and assist bona fide refugees to return to their countries of origin and to make this possible in practical terms. The refugees must be assured that their repatriation will be carried out voluntarily, in safety and dignity and without the threat of extralegal reprisals. They must also be offered the prospect of reintegration into their country's economic and social life. This will involve initial rehabilitation, security, restoration of the returnees' property and community development.

45. The cooperation of the Government of Rwanda will be of special importance. What Rwanda needs at this time is a new beginning and a process of genuine reconciliation in which the legitimate interests of all Rwandan citizens are adequately protected, so that they can work in harmony towards the social and

economic reconstruction of their country. The strengthening of the existing United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, as proposed above, will contribute to this process by inspiring confidence in the returnees and in the donor community.

46. However, the immediate concern of the Secretary-General is the fact that hundreds of thousands of men, women and children are still facing hunger, disease and violent death, most of them scattered in inaccessible and inhospitable areas of eastern Zaire beyond the reach of those who can bring them help. Neither the United Nations system nor the non-governmental organization community have the capacity in such conditions to secure access to the refugees and displaced persons and to deliver to them the relief they need with the necessary speed. This is why the Secretary-General believes that a practical way to avoid a humanitarian disaster is the establishment of some form of military presence in the region.

47. As regards the political issues that underlie this humanitarian crisis, it may be necessary for the United Nations to increase its presence in the subregion, with the consent of the Governments concerned, in order to enhance its capacity to assist those Governments, if they so wish, in managing and resolving the complex of problems that are currently so threatening to their internal cohesion and to their relations with each other. As already mentioned, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General has been asked to address this question and to make recommendations regarding the role of the United Nations in the subregion and the nature and structure of its future presence there.

48. The Secretary-General has asked his Special Envoy, Ambassador Chrétien, who has been to South Africa to consult with President Nelson Mandela, to proceed to Cameroon to consult with President Paul Biya in his capacity as current Chairman of OAU. The Special Envoy has kept in close touch with the leaders of the region, with the Secretary-General of OAU and with the special representatives of other organizations and countries. One of his objectives has been to promote a direct dialogue between the leaders of Zaire and Rwanda, since the relationship between these two countries is crucial to the stability in the entire region. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General has also held consultations regarding the proposal for an international conference on the Great Lakes region, which has been supported by the Security Council in several resolutions and presidential statements. As indicated earlier in the present report, the Special Envoy is expected to return to New York around 10 December 1996. The Secretary-General will report to the Council thereafter on his findings and recommendations.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/994
2 December 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 1 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ZAIRE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for the information of members of the Security Council, a communiqué dated 1 December 1996 from the Government of the Republic of Zaire concerning the situation in eastern Zaire.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex issued as a Security Council document.

(Signed) UKABU KHABOUJI N'ZAJI
Minister Plenipotentiary and
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

96-34591 (E) 021296 021296

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Annex

Communiqué from the Government of Zaire dated 1 December 1996 concerning the situation in eastern Zaire

1. On Saturday 30 November 1996 at 3.15 p.m., while troops of the Zairian armed forces were moving towards Butembo and, on the way, inflicting enormous losses on the aggressors, elements of the Ugandan regular army, travelling in tanks and armoured vehicles, arrived to reinforce the soldiers of the Rwandan patriotic army, entering Zaire through the border crossing point at Kasindi.

2. Since then, fighting has been raging between the Zairian armed forces and the invaders, who are trying to surround the town of Beni.

3. This incursion of the Ugandan army into Zairian territory follows attacks waged by that army against the Zairian districts of Jomba, Bunagana, Mahagi, Aru and Kasindi, in particular, in April, June, September, October and November 1996 respectively.

4. Notwithstanding the allegations that the repeated incursions of the Ugandan army against Zairian territory represent the right of pursuit against supporters of the Democratic Allied Front (FAD), a Ugandan rebel movement which is alleged to be supported by the Zairian authorities, the Government of the Republic of Zaire affirms that Uganda's latest attack against Zaire, with the help of tanks and armoured vehicles, is in reality the most irrefutable evidence of the involvement of the Ugandan army in the war which Rwanda is waging against Zaire in the regions of North Kivu and South Kivu.

5. The Government of the Republic of Zaire condemns in the strongest terms this aggression by Uganda against its territory.

6. The Government of Zaire also categorically denies the absurd affirmations about the support it is allegedly providing to FAD, about which nothing is known in Beni and Kasindi. The Zairian Government has not extended its support or recognition to any Ugandan rebel movement, and it knows nothing about the "Democratic Allied Front", whose actions are alleged by the Ugandan Government to have given rise to the right of pursuit in Zairian territory. Moreover, it is not maintaining and has not authorized any base for Ugandan Muslim rebels in its territory. The occupation by the Ugandan troops of the towns of Kasindi and Beni, along with the affirmations by the spokesman for the Ugandan Government that the Ugandan troops will remain in Zairian territory until the Zairian Government abandons its support for the Ugandan Muslim rebels in the border area and restores its authority in this region, is a pretext to justify the unprovoked aggression perpetrated against the Republic of Zaire.

7. The Government of the Republic of Zaire notes, further, that since Uganda has shown itself to be a belligerent State on the side of Rwanda, it is automatically disqualified from participating in the organizing committee of the multinational force established by the Ottawa meeting of 29 November 1996.

8. The involvement of the Ugandan army in the war which Rwanda is imposing on Zaire also invalidates the decision of the multinational force to establish its headquarters in Entebbe or Kampala.

9. The Government of the Republic of Zaire draws the attention of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the seriousness of the incidents described above.

10. The Government therefore calls on them to take energetic measures as a matter of urgency to put an end to Uganda's armed incursions into Zairian territory.

(Signed) Gérard KAMANDA wa KAMANDA
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of the Interior
Chairman of the Interministerial
Crisis Committee

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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2 December 1996

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 NOVEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Saint Kitts and Nevis to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit for his attention its Government's position with regard to Security Council resolution 1054 (1996) of 25 April 1996.

The Permanent Mission has the further honour to advise that the Government of Saint Kitts and Nevis expresses its compliance with the resolution and in particular with the stipulations outlined in paragraph 3 (b), and that immigration officials have been notified that access to Saint Kitts and Nevis shall be denied to "members of the Government of Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces".

96-34492 (E) 021296

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2 December 1996

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LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The combination of the delay in the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) and the exhaustion of the "matching funds" that the Government of the United States of America had transferred to the United Nations escrow account pursuant to resolution 778 (1992) has frustrated the ability of the United Nations Compensation Commission to present a totally funded draft budget for 1997, which amounts to some $28 million, when the Commission had projections of only $10.5 million being available in the Compensation Fund from savings and non-expenditures made during 1996.

As the problem began to loom, the Commission concentrated its efforts to avoid or delay incurring expenses in order to increase as much as possible the funds available for the following year's operations. These conservation efforts have resulted in the current expectation that the Fund will have $13 million available to finance the 1997 budget.

Simultaneously, the Commission addressed the 17 main claimant countries, those with claims worth over $1 billion each, to provide the Commission with recoverable bridging funds to fully finance the 1997 budget. The first positive reaction to these efforts came from the Government of Kuwait, which approved a reimbursable contribution of $5 million. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has advanced its decision to contribute $250,000 based on the expectation that the other claimant countries interested in the success of the compensation operation, and most particularly the members of the European Union, would also make contributions.

Through its Irish presidency, the European Union has also been directly approached having in mind that, during the last four years, almost all of the contributions to the United Nations escrow account pursuant to resolution 778 (1992), which triggered the United States matching funds that have kept the Compensation Commission financially afloat, came from countries that are members of the European Union - as well as from the European Union itself through its Commission.

We have also directly approached the Governments that had confiscated the proceeds of the sale of amounts of Iraqi oil in 1991 but have not yet transferred, even partially, such funds to the United Nations escrow account for Iraq-related operations, from which the Compensation Fund would draw 30 per cent.

Parallel with this, the United Nations Compensation Commission has been following closely, through direct and indirect sources, the advancing process of the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) in order to assess its feasibility and proximity as well as its timely impact on the Commission's ability to fully fund its budget for 1997. It should be pointed out that the Governing Council of the Commission has mandated the creation of a reserve equal to one additional year's budgetary costs, that is, 1997 and 1998.

All these considerations have advised in favour of delaying this report until a clearer picture has emerged, which now seems to be the case. The most recent events with regard to resolution 986 (1995) can now be taken into account as the 1997 budget is reviewed and decided upon, since the prospects for full funding are now significantly improving.

We trust that now, with the full support of the Security Council, resolution 986 (1995) will be finally and wholly implemented, allowing the Compensation Commission to fulfil integrally the mission that the Council entrusted to it in 1991.

Nevertheless, our efforts continue in order to obtain as many as possible bridging contributions, even in the form of pledges that would be made effective only on the contingency that resolution 986 (1995) were still not to be fully implemented by the end of the first quarter of 1997.

In the meantime, the Commission would deeply appreciate all efforts that the Security Council and its President can put into effect to spur the temporary bridging contributions that the Commission is seeking in the immediate future, which would be immediately reimbursed in full once the funds resulting from implementation of resolution 986 (1995) are made available to the Compensation Fund.

Thank you most warmly for the attention given to this information and its request.

(Signed) Giuseppe BALDOCCI
President
Governing Council
United Naticns Compensation Commission

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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2 December 1996
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LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CAMEROON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to the verbal message which, on 29 November 1996, the members of the Security Council asked me to convey to His Excellency Mr. Paul Biya, President of the Republic of Cameroon and current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), regarding the election of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the letter which Mr. Biya addressed to the heads of State of OAU members. In it, he asked those who wished to put forward candidates to notify the Security Council directly and to inform him of their action.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean Marc MPAY
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Minister Plenipotentiary

Annex

Letter dated 29 November 1996 from the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity addressed to the heads of States members of the Organization

As you are aware, the thirty-second summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) requested me to take the necessary steps with States Members of the United Nations in order to ensure that Africa is granted a second term of five years at the head of the Secretariat of the United Nations. The candidature of the present Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was endorsed at the summit.

As I had been entrusted to do, I officially presented that position to the General Assembly on 24 October 1996. In the same spirit, I have conducted intensive consultations with members of the Security Council and with other Member States.

However, owing to the veto wielded by one of the permanent members of the Security Council, those efforts have been unsuccessful.

Nevertheless, as far as I am aware, the Security Council still appears to favour the idea of Africa being represented for a second term in the position of Secretary-General of the United Nations.

It would appear from my numerous contacts, and from the consultations I have held, that in order to ensure that Africa has the opportunity to serve a second five-year term, the time has come for African States which wish to do so to put forward other suitable candidates, in addition to Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Those States may contact the Security Council directly, and inform the current Chairman of OAU of their action.

In view of the urgency of this issue, I should be grateful if you would send me your reply as soon as possible.

(Signed) Paul BIYA

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 40
THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
PROCEDURES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A FIRM AND LASTING PEACE AND
PROGRESS IN FASHIONING A REGION
OF PEACE, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala

Report of the Secretary-General

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 50/220 of 3 April 1996, in which the Assembly decided to authorize the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA) for a further period of 9 months and 13 days, that is until 31 December 1996, and requested me, inter alia, to keep the Assembly fully informed of the implementation of the resolution.

2. Since my last report on the activities of MINUGUA (A/50/881), the peace process between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) has made considerable headway. I have reported on a regular basis to the General Assembly on this progress, in particular in my latest report on the situation in Central America, which covered developments until September 1996 (A/51/338, paras. 31-39). In that report, I stressed the importance of the agreement on social and economic aspects and the agrarian situation, signed at Mexico City on 6 May 1996. Another major agreement was signed at Mexico City on 19 September 1996 namely the agreement on the strengthening of Civilian Power and on the role of the armed forces in a democratic society (A/51/410-S/1996/853, annex). It contains a comprehensive set of provisions for the strengthening of democratic institutions in Guatemala, including the executive branch, the legislature and the judiciary. In the context of ending 35 years of armed conflict, it emphasizes in particular the

need to overhaul the security functions of the State: under a reformed Constitution, the police are to be restructured, strengthened and consolidated in a new National Civil Police, which will assume responsibility for internal security; intelligence gathering activities are to be reorganized and regulated; and the army will limit its role to external defence and will adjust its doctrine, training, deployment, size and budget accordingly. The signing of the agreement has opened the way for the final phase of the negotiations, namely the consideration of the cluster of so-called "operative" issues, which include the definitive ceasefire, the reinsertion of URNG and the timetable for implementation and verification of the peace agreements.

3. In late October, as consideration of these issues began, the negotiating process was shaken by the news that a senior field commander of one of the four factions which make up URNG had been involved in the kidnapping of an elderly woman in Guatemala City. In addition to being a serious violation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights (A/48/928-S/1994/448, annex I), this action was in stark contradiction with the spirit that had characterized the peace process throughout the year and with the confidence-building measures pledged by both sides. The incident affected the process all the more severely as there is widespread outrage in Guatemala at the wave of kidnappings that has afflicted the country in recent months. On 29 October, in a public statement, I deplored the incident and its damaging consequences for the negotiating process and I called upon URNG to take the action necessary to restore conditions in which a final peace agreement could promptly be reached. Between 30 October and 7 November, the URNG leadership issued several public statements in which it acknowledged and lamented the involvement of URNG members in the kidnapping; offered, as a confidence-building measure, to suspend all armed propaganda activities and other acts that could affect the peace process; proposed that negotiations resume with priority being given to the negotiation of the definitive ceasefire; and announced that the leader of the faction to which the kidnapper had belonged would withdraw from the negotiating table. As a result, negotiations resumed at Mexico City on 9 November and the parties quickly reached an understanding about the substantive provisions of the agreement on the definitive ceasefire.

4. In view of the progress made, the two parties confirmed on 11 November that, as they had stated on 6 August, conditions existed to reach agreement on all pending items of the negotiating agenda by the end of December 1996. Specifically, they agreed to sign the agreement on a firm and lasting peace at Guatemala City on 29 December 1996. They have since adopted the following schedule for the signing of the remaining agreements: the agreement on the definitive ceasefire is to be signed at Oslo on 4 December 1996; the agreement on constitutional reforms and the electoral regime is to be signed at Stockholm on 7 December 1996; and the agreement on a basis for the reintegration of URNG into political life is to be signed at Madrid on 12 December 1996. The agreement on the timetable for the implementation and verification of the peace accords will be signed in Guatemala City on 29 December 1996 together with the agreement on a firm and lasting peace.

5. The progress made at the negotiating table has been accompanied by tangible progress in compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights. MINUGUA's fifth report (A/50/1006 of 19 July 1996) covered human rights

verification and institution-building activities from 1 January to 30 June 1996. Its sixth report, covering the period from 1 July to 31 December 1996, will be issued in January 1997. MINUGUA has observed that since the informal cessation of military activities by the parties in late March 1996, there have been no military or civilian casualties related to the armed confrontation. In the context of this de facto cessation of the war and progress at the negotiating table, the Government has started a programme to disarm and demobilize the paramilitary "Voluntary Civil Defence Committees". Under the provisions of the agreement on the strengthening of civilian power and on the role of the armed forces in a democratic society, that programme is to be completed 30 days after the signing of the final peace agreement. It is also significant that during its first year in power the Government has made a major effort to combat crime, corruption and impunity and has removed from office or sanctioned a number of high-ranking officials who appeared to be involved in criminal activities.

6. While these initiatives demonstrate the Government's firm decision to fight impunity, they have also drawn attention to the gravity of the problem and the magnitude of the effort required to correct long-standing deficiencies in institutions entrusted with preventing, investigating, prosecuting and punishing crime and human rights abuses. In a situation in which respect for human rights is still precarious, the continuing efforts of President Alvaro Arzú's Government are to be commended and should receive full support from the international community.

7. The role of MINUGUA has evolved with the positive changes registered in Guatemala. Verification of complaints received has revealed specific weaknesses in the areas of the administration of justice and law enforcement and pointed to the need to strengthen the relevant institutions. Thus, the Mission has placed increasing emphasis on its institution-building role. In particular, there has been significant progress in pilot projects to improve the efficiency of, and access to, the administration of justice. Progress has also been made in assisting the legislative reform of the judicial system, which is to be implemented in 1997. The demand for participation in institution-building activities by non-governmental organizations has steadily increased. There continues to be very positive cooperation between the Joint Unit of MINUGUA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the institutions and entities concerned. With its verification activities, its technical assistance and its nationwide deployment, MINUGUA has continued to be a key factor in the peace process throughout 1996.

8. Under the terms of section I of General Assembly resolution 50/216 of 23 December 1995, the Secretary-General had been authorized to enter into commitments in an amount not exceeding a monthly level of US$ 2,329,700 (net of staff assessment) in the event of an extension of MINUGUA beyond 31 March 1996. The total commitment thus authorized by the General Assembly for MINUGUA during its current period, between 1 April and 31 December 1996, amounts to $20,967,300 net ($22,704,800 gross).

9. As mentioned in paragraph 4 above, the parties have announced that the final peace agreement will be signed on 29 December 1996. On that day, the full package of peace accords will enter into force. This will represent a major challenge for the parties, in particular for the Government, which has most of

the responsibility for implementation. It will also represent a challenge to the United Nations, which was requested by the parties to the Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca of 10 January 1994 (A/49/61-S/1994/53, annex) and all subsequent agreements to carry out international verification of the peace accords. The international community will also be called upon to assist the parties in complying with their undertakings. The Secretariat and MINUGUA have been studying how verification can be most effectively carried out. Final recommendations regarding the mandate and structure of the verification mission cannot, however, be completed until all agreements, and in particular the agreement on the timetable for implementation and verification, have been signed.

10. As the package of peace agreements is not expected to be finalized until late December and the current mandate of MINUGUA expires on 31 December 1996, I recommend to the General Assembly that the mandate be extended for a further period of three months, that is, until 31 March 1997, during which time the Mission should be maintained at its current strength. This will allow time for the preparation of detailed recommendations on how the structure and staffing of MINUGUA should be redesigned to enable the Mission to fulfil its new responsibilities.

11. As regards the Mission's tasks, it is anticipated that the future agreement on the timetable for implementation and verification of the peace accords will provide for a number of urgent measures of implementation to be taken before 31 March 1997. These will fall outside the current mandate of MINUGUA, which relates exclusively to the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and the human rights aspects of the agreement on identity and rights of indigenous peoples. With the consent of both parties, I recommend that MINUGUA be authorized, on an exceptional basis, to verify implementation of all such urgent measures during this three-month period within its existing capabilities.

12. Verification of measures related to the agreement on the definitive ceasefire will also be required very soon after signature of the overall package of peace accords. This will involve the deployment of United Nations military personnel to verify the ceasefire, the separation of forces and the demobilization of URNG combatants.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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2 December 1996
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LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States, British and French aircraft continued over the period 15 to 30 November 1996 and that the aircraft in question carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

You are requested to intervene with the countries in question with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek legal compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State by these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Violations of Iraq's airspace and damage caused, 15-30 November 1996

1. In the northern region 78 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, Zakho, Ayn Zalah, Sinjar and Aqrah.

2. In the southern region 385 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Amarah, Qurnah, Artawi, Chabaish, Jalibah, Salman, Shatrah, Lasaf, Najaf, Qal'at Salih, Ushbayjah, Shaykh Sa'd South, Ali al-Sharqi, Diwaniyah, Busayyah, Suq al-Shuyukh, Shinafiyah, Kut, Ali al-Gharbi, Hayy, Qal'at Sukkar, Nukhayb, Najaf South and Amghar.

3. On eight occasions United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated the Republic of Iraq's airspace in the southern region before leaving in the direction of Kuwait.

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2 December 1996

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PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 1075 (1996) of 11 October 1996, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to report by 1 December 1996 on the progress made towards consolidating the peace process in Angola. It provides an update to my report dated 19 November 1996 (S/1996/960) and also covers developments in the human rights, humanitarian and socio-economic areas since my earlier report of 4 October 1996 (S/1996/827). In addition, the report includes recommendations on the role the United Nations could continue to play in Angola, as well as plans for the downsizing of UNAVEM III's formed military units.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. With the support of the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, continued his consultations with the Angolan Government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in order to ensure the timely implementation of the tasks enumerated in resolution 1075 (1996) and in the consolidated timetable approved by the Joint Commission.

3. On 21 November 1996, the Joint Commission reviewed the status of implementation of the tasks included in the consolidated timetable. The Commission took note of the efforts made by the parties to implement a number of these tasks, especially those related to military aspects, and urged both of them to exert additional efforts to fulfil all their commitments.

4. The Joint Commission will soon consider the proposals made by the Government and UNITA on the special status for the leader of the largest opposition party. It is hoped that the Government and UNITA will be able to reach an agreement on this important issue in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Lusaka Protocol. It is also hoped that the political tensions which emerged following the recent revision of the Constitution (see S/1996/960, para. 5) will not cause further delays in the peace process. In my message to

the Angolan people on the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994, I stressed the imperative need to accelerate the pace of implementation of the provisions of the Protocol.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS AND GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION

5. Since my last report to the Security Council, the temporary upward trend in the number of ceasefire violations has gone into reverse. Among the contributing factors was the withdrawal of Government forces from several locations in Huila, Benguela, Bié and Lunda Sul provinces which they had taken over during the last two months. In the meantime, the transport of UNITA troops from Cabinda to a mainland quartering area was completed on 19 November 1996. However, the pulling back of Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) from two forward positions in the Lundas is still pending.

6. As of 28 November 1996, 69,093 UNITA troops had been registered in 15 quartering areas; 13,115 of these troops had subsequently deserted, and a total of 29,698 personal weapons and 4,521 crew-served weapons had been handed over by the quartered soldiers. Some 18,738 of the expected 26,300 UNITA troops had been selected for incorporation into FAA and the pace of this exercise has accelerated since the Government lifted strict age and education criteria for selection. In the meantime, demobilization resumed (still mostly of under-age soldiers), with 629 troops released from the quartering areas. After many months, however, most of the UNITA fighters still remain in the quartering areas, thereby placing an additional financial burden on the international community and depriving the country of much-needed resources for reconstruction. The protracted presence of these troops in the camps could also have serious repercussions on security. The Government has not yet initiated the actual incorporation of these UNITA troops into FAA, nor has it incorporated the nine UNITA generals who have been waiting in Luanda for over a month to join FAA.

7. After several weeks of procrastination, UNITA allowed UNAVEM III to remove weapons discovered in an arms cache in Negage, but the United Nations is still awaiting a declaration by UNITA that it has assembled all its troops and handed over all weapons. In the meantime, the dismantling of illegal checkpoints has proceeded, contributing considerably to the free circulation of people. However, approximately 77 checkpoints (many operated by the Government police) are still maintained throughout the country. UNITA also declared that it has phased out its regional command structures and this is now being verified by the United Nations. In sum, while considerable progress has recently been achieved on the military front, some of the tasks enumerated in resolution 1075 (1996) and in the consolidated timetable approved by the Joint Commission were not fulfilled by the 15 November deadline. It is now hoped that they will be completed by early December at the latest.

8. The security situation remains volatile in many parts of the country. In recent weeks, dozens of civilians have been attacked, often in highway ambushes, and killed by unidentified gunmen. Some of these crimes were perpetrated near assembly areas, and UNAVEM is conducting investigations to identify the culprits. On the positive side, there have been no major cases during the reporting period of harassment of UNAVEM personnel who, among other tasks, are

increasingly involved in the verification of areas recently vacated by UNITA forces. This is being done with a view to ensuring the orderly, gradual and peaceful transition of these areas to the State administration.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

9. As of 28 November 1996, 3,860 out of the expected 4,962 UNITA police personnel had been moved to quartering areas where they are being duly processed. So far, 2,345 different types of weapons and 3,550 rounds of ammunition have been surrendered. It is envisaged that the selection of UNITA personnel for incorporation into the Angolan National Police (ANP) and the rapid reaction police will begin simultaneously in all quartering areas immediately after completion of the registration of all the declared UNITA police. The recruited personnel will then undergo a three-month training programme. In the meantime, the selection of 212 UNITA personnel for training and induction into the ANP as bodyguards for UNITA leaders has been finalized.

10. After an interruption of several weeks, the disarming of the civilian population by the Government has resumed, and 99 crew-served weapons, 2,398 firearms of various types and 15,328 rounds of ammunition had been collected by 28 November. All the above activities have been extensively monitored and verified by the United Nations civilian police component.

11. At the same time, UNAVEM III has continued its public awareness campaign and other activities to promote respect for human rights. Some of these public education programmes were aimed at restoring confidence and dialogue between the representatives of the Government and UNITA at various levels and at fostering national reconciliation; one such programme was launched in Benguela Province in October. Similarly, with the assistance of Sweden, the Government began human rights training for selected personnel to serve in provincial institutions, as well as for civic education monitors in Bié, Menongue and Huíla provinces. These activities have often encouraged the local population to organize themselves into human rights committees, the most recent of which was set up in Uíge Province. As of 28 November, 57 allegations of human rights violations had been submitted to UNAVEM III and were investigated by its human rights and CIVPOL units. This important issue, together with those of governance, public accountability and capacity-building in the law and order field, deserve increased attention in the present phase of the peace process. I wish to express my appreciation to the European Union for its generous contribution of the services of human rights experts and, in particular, for the recent renewal of their contracts until February 1997. I very much hope that their services will be made available beyond that date.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

A. Relief and rehabilitation

12. During the reporting period, United Nations humanitarian activities continued to concentrate on the expansion of programmes to newly accessible areas and on the return of internally displaced persons to their areas of

origin. Limited rehabilitation activities also continued throughout the country in order to encourage the return of the displaced and to assist local communities with the provision of basic services. Reports indicate that approximately 25,000 internally displaced persons have received assistance in returning home from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). However, military roadblocks, banditry and other impediments to the free circulation of people and goods continue to hamper humanitarian efforts and discourage the movement of displaced persons, particularly in Huambo, Huíla, Malange, Moxico and Uíge provinces. Over 1 million internally displaced persons, concentrated mainly in urban or peri-urban areas, will thus continue to rely on humanitarian assistance until conditions are established for their return.

13. The current distribution of seeds and tools by humanitarian organizations is now in its final stage and has benefited 530,570 families, with most of the materials having already been delivered at the village level. As a result of the efforts of the United Nations in the rehabilitation of roads and bridges and in demining, the World Food Programme (WFP) was able to deliver 85 per cent of the seeds by road, thus economizing on transport costs.

B. Mine clearance and road rehabilitation

14. Under the coordination of the United Nations Central Mine Action Office, the mine awareness campaign and mine survey and clearance throughout the country continued to be conducted by the Angolan demining brigades, which are trained and supported by UNAVEM III, the United Nations-contracted company MECHEM and specialized NGOs operating in nine provinces. Unfortunately, UNITA has not yet given its clearance for the demining of the Malange-Kuito road, which is the only major route in Angola still closed to traffic. Accidents resulting in serious injuries to deminers occurred during NGO demining operations in the localities of Caxito, Luena and Menongue. As a result, an international NGO ceased operations in Cunene Province, but two new international NGOs introduced plans for survey and demining operations in support of WFP in Bengo and Benguela provinces.

15. With support from UNAVEM III and the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordnance (INAROE) has now established four regional headquarters and deployed six demining brigades, each with a strength of approximately 65 personnel. However, only three of the brigades are fully operational. Plans to deploy an additional two brigades by the end of 1996 have been postponed, owing primarily to a shortage of international supervisors and a lack of critical equipment. INAROE, with a trained workforce of over 350 deminers, is now the largest single demining organization in Angola, but it continues to rely on the United Nations for assistance in training and management and for logistic support. A two-year plan for the development of Angola's national demining capacity will commence in January 1997 under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. As part of this exercise, and pursuant to the recommendation contained in paragraph 22 of my report of 4 October 1996 (S/1996/827), UNAVEM III is considering the transfer of its demining equipment to the UNDP/Department of Humanitarian Affairs project. In

my next report, I will inform the Security Council of the details of this transition plan, as well as of the phase-out strategy for UNAVEM III military personnel who are currently involved in demining activities in this programme.

C. Assistance to quartering areas

16. United Nations agencies and NGOs continue to provide humanitarian assistance and civic training to some 54,000 UNITA troops still remaining in quartering areas and to more than 100,000 of their dependants in satellite camps. So far, over 200,000 medical examinations and follow-up treatments have been carried out among quartered soldiers. At the same time, special programmes to address severe malnutrition, trypanosomiasis and tuberculosis were conducted in those areas most affected by these diseases.

17. The duration of quartering well beyond the time-frame set out in the Lusaka Protocol poses a serious challenge to international humanitarian organizations and to the sustainability of the peace process. It is therefore imperative that demobilization commence in earnest and that the quartering areas be converted into demobilization centres under the responsibility of the Government of Angola.

D. Demobilization and reintegration

18. Approximately 100,000 ex-combatants from the Government and UNITA armed forces are expected to be demobilized. However, as indicated in paragraph 6 above, to date only several hundred under-age soldiers have been returned to their areas of origin. All received the necessary discharge documents as well as the demobilization benefits provided by the Government and the international community. However, serious difficulties arose as a result of repeated violations by UNITA officials of the soldiers' right to choose freely where they would be resettled. The irregular disbursement by the Government of the special subsidy for demobilized soldiers also impeded the smooth implementation of this exercise.

19. On 11 October 1996, in cooperation with the Humanitarian Assistance Coordinating Unit and United Nations agencies and programmes, UNAVEM III finalized a United Nations operational support plan for demobilization. In particular, the plan articulates UNAVEM III's exit strategy from the quartering and demobilization phases and envisages the Mission's involvement in recommending safe routeings for convoys carrying demobilized soldiers and their families. In special cases UNAVEM III military and police observers will accompany the convoys. However, the main responsibility for the safe transport of demobilized soldiers and their dependants lies with the Government.

20. Meanwhile, the Technical Ad Hoc Working Group of the Joint Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration is finalizing a plan of action for the demobilization of war-disabled soldiers and other personnel not eligible for induction into FAA. Through a UNDP-financed programme for the rehabilitation of former combatants, counselling and referral offices will be established in 13 provinces by the end of November 1996. Linked to this, quick-impact projects

for ex-soldiers are being developed with the assistance of national and international NGOs. While donors have already committed approximately US$ 10 million to such projects over the past six months, at least another $15 million will be required during the next year if adequate assistance is to be provided to all the ex-soldiers. In addition, a total of $19 million is needed to extend humanitarian activities in quartering areas until January 1997, when it is expected they will be converted into demobilization centres.

VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

21. During the reporting period, Angola continued to be confronted with severe economic conditions. The current economic situation is characterized by a near stagnant production sector (except for petroleum), continued infrastructural deterioration, a high budget deficit and an annual rate of inflation which exceeded 3,000 per cent. Excessive expansion of credit, leading to a massive growth in the money supply, and increasing commercial speculation are other hallmarks of the present state of the Angolan economy. Civil service wages and salaries remain very low. The rate of unemployment is currently estimated at 45 per cent, while over 60 per cent of the population subsists below the poverty level.

22. With the launching of the "Programa Nova Vida" (New Life Programme) in June 1996, the Government began to adopt urgent measures to address the fundamental causes of the deterioration of the economy. It has also been keen to enforce discipline and increase transparency in the management of State resources and to introduce new methods of management. Since June 1996, there has been a decline in the monthly rate of inflation, from 84 per cent in May 1996 to 5 per cent in September. The foreign exchange rate has remained stable for more than three months, which is a noteworthy achievement. Other major economic developments include the adoption of a Government decree to end the commercial banking operations of the Central Bank and the tightening of credit on private borrowing. Interest rates are being adjusted on a regular basis to compensate for inflation. The Government is currently undertaking only those expenditures which have been approved by the Cabinet within a revised and more realistic budget.

23. As a follow-up to the recent visit to Angola of the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Mr. Michel Camdessus, a team from the Fund has arrived in Luanda and initiated a series of discussions with the Government in order to design economic reform programmes. An emergency programme for six months, supported by an emergency operation fund, is foreseen. This would be followed by a three-year structural adjustment programme which would be supported by a World Bank adjustment operation and be in synergy with the relief and rehabilitation activities of the United Nations system. The team will also work with the Government in preparing the 1997 budget with a view to reducing the budget deficit.

24. The Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP), which was prepared with the assistance of UNDP, emphasized three key targets over the last quarter: institutional reinforcement, project identification and selection, and data collection and analysis. Within the framework of the UNDP capacity-building

programme, the CRP has placed key technicians and equipment in the Central Technical Support Unit in the Ministry of Planning in Luanda and the provincial directorates of planning in Huambo, Uíge, Malange and Benguela. In the meantime, numerous projects have already been identified for financing under the CRP, ranging from small educational programmes to community production centres. Two of the projects, Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers and Vocational Training for Ex-Combatants, are being supported by UNDP as well as through Trust Fund contributions.

25. In an effort to coordinate various rehabilitation efforts, a comprehensive data collection project has been initiated. A report issued recently by UNDP provides information on nationwide donor interventions. The document discusses more than 30 projects at various stages of execution which are being supported by the development partners under the umbrella of the CRP and provides valuable information on financing mechanisms.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

26. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 50/209 B of 7 June 1996, the revised budget for the maintenance of UNAVEM III for the period after 1 July 1996 (A/51/494/Add.1 and 2), which takes into account the withdrawal of four infantry and support units by the end of December 1996, has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its current session. The reduced cost of maintaining UNAVEM III is now estimated at $25,452,733 gross ($24,953,130 net) per month beginning 1 January 1997. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III, as recommended in paragraph 34 below, the cost of maintaining the Mission during the extension period will be within the monthly rate indicated above, subject, of course, to the approval of the new budget by the General Assembly.

27. As at 25 November 1996, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM special account for the period since the inception of the Mission amounted to $138.8 million. At the same time, the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations was $1,741.3 million.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

28. The second anniversary of the signing of the Lusaka Protocol was commemorated on 20 November 1996. During the past two years, the country has lived in relative peace. Substantial progress has recently been made in carrying out the major tasks outlined in Security Council resolution 1075 (1996). Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol nevertheless continues to proceed in fits and starts, often only after increased pressure has been applied on the parties. This unsatisfactory state of affairs cannot continue, and in my report of 19 November (S/1996/960), I dealt with the most pressing tasks which must be completed without further delay.

29. It is certainly possible - and indeed it is imperative - for the parties to carry out all their obligations in the consolidated mediation timetable before the expiration of the present mandate of UNAVEM III on 11 December 1996. This

would enable my Special Representative to concentrate on resolving the key outstanding political issues. I therefore appeal to the Government and UNITA to resolve the issue of the return to Luanda of UNITA deputies to the National Assembly, to establish the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, and to reach agreement on the special status of the leader of the largest opposition party before 1 January 1997. Further procrastination in resolving these issues may negatively affect both the peace process and the willingness of the international community to maintain its extensive involvement in Angola.

30. As of 28 November 1996, UNAVEM III had 7,003 military personnel of all ranks, including 341 military observers, deployed at over 70 locations throughout Angola. Six infantry battalions, as well as numerous military support units, have been stationed in six major areas of operation in Angola (see map). Their presence, together with that of the civilian police observers and other United Nations components, has had a positive effect on the military and political situation. However, I am also mindful of the financial burden that UNAVEM III, as the largest current United Nations peacekeeping operation, imposes on the Member States. The withdrawal of four UNAVEM III military, support and infantry units has therefore been initiated, and I intend, as we approach the end of the two-year period foreseen in resolution 976 (1995) for the completion of this operation, to plan for the gradual and progressive withdrawal of the Mission. At the same time, I am aware that several crucial tasks of the peace process are far from complete and that Angola will continue to need the stabilizing presence of United Nations forces.

31. Against this background, I recommend that the withdrawal of UNAVEM III military units resume in February 1997, with a view to a complete drawdown within a period of six to seven months. Having consulted my Special Representative, it is my intention to repatriate by mid-June 1997 four of the six UNAVEM III infantry battalions, together with additional support units and some military headquarters personnel, with the remainder of the formed units to be repatriated by the end of July or August 1997. At the same time, I believe that a rapid reaction force should be retained, comprising six company-sized infantry groups, one of which would be deployed in each of the operational regions of Angola until completion of the withdrawal of all military contingents, unless the political and security conditions permit a more expeditious drawdown. This rapid reaction force would provide a basic safety net to allow other United Nations components to function effectively and to help maintain the much-needed confidence between the Angolan parties.

32. Implementation of the overall plan for withdrawal of the formed units would also need to take account of the extent of completion of the most essential military tasks, such as the closure of the quartering areas, demobilization and effective integration and functioning of FAA and the police which, together with the extension of State administration, should gradually re-establish Government authority over the whole national territory.

33. In order to conclude the implementation of the tasks contained in the Lusaka Protocol and to consolidate the gains made so far in the peace process, a continued but substantially scaled-down presence of the United Nations in Angola will be required after February 1997. At the same time, the activities of the Mission will be increasingly concentrated on political, police and human rights

monitoring, vital humanitarian activities including demining, as well as public information programmes and logistic support to the whole Mission. I intend to elaborate on these tasks in my next report to the Security Council and to make recommendations on the mandate, structure and size of a follow-up United Nations presence after the withdrawal of the bulk of UNAVEM III's formed military units.

34. In the meantime, and having in mind the considerations presented above, I recommend that the present mandate of UNAVEM III be extended until 28 February 1997.

35. The demobilization of tens of thousands of troops and their reintegration into civilian society are among the most critical challenges under the Lusaka Protocol. As a result of continued delays in the demobilization phase, humanitarian assistance to quartered personnel will have to be provided for a much longer period than was initially expected. I appeal to donors to provide additional resources to support these vital tasks as well as the programmes for the subsequent demobilization of soldiers which are expected to gain momentum in the coming weeks. Rehabilitation of rural communities is also an important aspect of the overall peace effort. Significant resources are needed to assist the large number of refugees, displaced persons and former combatants in resettlement areas. To this end, I strongly urge the donor community to fulfil the pledges they undertook at the 1995 Brussels Round Table Conference.

36. Finally, I would like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, to all civilian, military and police staff of UNAVEM III, as well as to the personnel of United Nations humanitarian programmes and agencies and international NGOs for their remarkable dedication and unfailing efforts in support of the consolidation of the peace process in Angola.

UNAVEM III
Deployment as of 25 November 1996
HQ UNAVEM HQ
RHQ Regional HQ
Planned UNMO's and UNPO's
UNMO's and UNPO's
UNMO's only
UNPO's only
Each Regional HQ is co-located with: RUS and POR
CONGO
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
LUANDA
Cabinda
Soyo
Sumba
Noqui
Maquela do Zombo
Quimbele
M'banza Congo
N'zeto
Uige
Negage
Bungo
Quibaxe
Caxito
N'dalatando
Caiomboloca
Malanje
Cafunfo
Lucamba
Catala
Muchinda
Lovua
Cuito
Dundo
Andrada
Camaxilo
Lucapa
Chiluage
SAURIMO
Cacolo
Quibala
Gungo
Mussende
Sumbe
Waku Kungo
Alto Hama
Londumbali
Balombo
Lobito
Benguela
HUAMBO
Andulo
N'harea
Kuito
LUENA
Lumeje
Luau
Caromba
Cuemba
Vila Nova Sambo
Chitembo
Soma Kuanza
Cubal
Chicuma
Chongoroi
Caconda
N'gove
Galague
Quilengues
Cacula
Matala
Kuvango
MENONGUE
LUBANGO
Namibe
Cuito Cuanavale
Lumbala N'gumbo
Mavinga
Caiundo
Xangongo
Ondjiva
Luau
Jamba
Mucusso
SOUTHERN REGION
EASTERN REGION
NORTHERN REGION
CENTRAL REGION
NORTH-EASTERN REGION
SOUTH-EASTERN REGION
International boundary
National capital
The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Cartographic Section

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit a copy of three notes verbales with attachments dated 25 October 1996 from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. to the Embassy of Pakistan, to be forwarded to the United States Department of State, on the violation of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran by the forces of the United States in the Persian Gulf region.

It would be highly appreciated if the text of the present letter and its annexes could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-34764 (E) 041296

/...

Annex I

Note verbale dated 25 October 1996 from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. addressed to the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C.

The Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. presents its compliments to the Embassy of Pakistan and has the honour to enclose two copies, the original text and an unofficial translation, of a message received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is respectfully requested that the original text be transmitted to the United States Department of State and that our office be informed of their response.

Enclosure

According to information received from officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 13 August 1996, an Iranian helicopter belonging to the Ministry of Oil and Petroleum, whose mission was to transport the Ministry's employee from Khark Island to Frouzan Oil Platform, was forced to return to Frouzan Oil Platform owing to the warnings of the United States forces and their military exercise north of the Frouzan Oil Platform.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran protests these illegal measures by the United States Government and calls for an end to such actions.

Annex II

Note verbale dated 25 October 1996 from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. addressed to the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C.

The Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. presents its compliments to the Embassy of Pakistan and has the honour to enclose two copies, the original text and an unofficial translation, of a message received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is respectfully requested that the original text be transmitted to the United States Department of State and that our office be informed of their response.

Enclosure

According to information received from officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 29 July 1996, at 1840 hours, United States flotillas at the position of N2835 and E5013 jammed the system over an Iranian patrolling unit, whose position was N2821 and E5024. A United States F-16 aircraft has also, on a number of occasions, flown over an Iranian patrolling flotilla.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran protests these illegal activities by the United States Government and calls for an end to such actions.

Annex III

Note verbale dated 25 October 1996 from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. addressed to the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C.

The Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. presents its compliments to the Embassy of Pakistan and has the honour to enclose two copies, the original text and an unofficial translation, of a message received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic republic of Iran. It is respectfully requested that the original text be transmitted to the United States Department of State and that our office be informed of their response.

Enclosure

According to information received from officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 2 May 1996, at 1000 hours, two United States helicopters flew over and photographed an Iranian exploratory hydrographic vessel on a routine hydrographical mission whose position was N2702 and E5154. Said helicopters came very close to the vessel and this pursuit lasted for two hours.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran protests these illegal activities by the United States Government and calls for an end to such actions.